Abstract. URANOS is an Android application which uses syntactical static analysis to determine in which component of an Android application a permission is required. This work describes how the detection and analysis of widely distributed and security critical adware plugins is achieved. We show, how users can trigger bytecode rewriting to (de)activate selected or redundant permissions in Android applications without sacrificing functionality. The paper also discusses performance, security, and legal implications of the presented approach.
Introduction
Many Smartphone operating systems associate shared resources with permissions. API calls accessing such resources require permissions to gain the required privileges. Once an application obtains these privileges, it can generally access all the items stored in the respective resource. Additionally, such privileges are often valid until the deinstallation or an update of the application. These properties conflict with the emerging privacy needs of users. Increasing sensitivity encourages the protection of data which helps applications, vendors, or providers to generate individual user profiles. Unfortunately, current coarse grained permission systems only provide limited control or information about an application. Hence, informed consents to the use of permissions are far from being available.
In Android, numerous analyses of permissions requested by an application [3, 11, 14, 20, 21] substantiate this problem. Permissions increase the attack surface of an application [4, 2, 12] and the platform executing it. Thus, granting permissions in excessive manners induces new exploit techniques. Static analysis and runtime monitoring frameworks have been developed to detect permission-based platform and application vulnerabilities. There are also Android core extensions enabling the deactivation of selected permissions. However, such frameworks either interfere with the usability of the application and render it unusable or they only provide permission analysis on separate hosts.
Thus, there is a strong need for flexible security solutions which do not aim at generality and precision but couple lightweight analysis and permission modification mechanisms.
We define URANOS, an application rewriting framework for Android which enables the selective deactivation of permissions for specific application contexts, e.g. plugins. The contributions of this paper include an on-device static analysis to detect permissions and their usage, selective on-device rewriting to guarantee user-specific permission settings, and a prototype implementing detection and rewriting in common Android applications.
Our contribution is structured as follows: Section 3 provides a knowledge base for this contribution, Section 2 gives a high-level overview of URANOS. Its components are explained in Section 4. Section 5 discusses performance, limitations, and legal implications. Finally, Section 6 lists related work before Section 7 summarizes our conclusions. We strive for an efficient on-device framework (see Figure 1) for Android which allows users to selectively disable permissions assigned to an application. To preserve functionality a static analysis infers the permissions required during execution from the bytecode. For efficiency we exploit existing knowledge about the permission requirements of Android API calls, resource access, intent broadcasting etc. Detected permissions are compared with the permissions requested in the application manifest to detect excessive permissions etc. Additionally, we scan the bytecode for plugins using a pre-generated database of API methods and classes used in popular adware. They define context for each bytecode instruction. This allows us to infer the permissions exclusively required for plugins or for the application hosting the plugins. We communicate this information to the user. Depending on his needs, the user can enable or disable permissions for specific application contexts.
Approach Overview
Disabled and excessive permissions can be completely removed from the manifest. However, removing an effectively required permission will trigger a security exception during runtime. If these exceptions are unhandled the application will terminate. Therefore, URANOS additionally adapts the application bytecode and replaces the API calls in the respective call context by feasible wrappers.
This combination of analysis and rewriting allows a user to generate operational applications compliant with his security needs. Unfortunately, compliant but rewritten Android applications are neither directly installed nor are they updated by Android. Therefore, URANOS also delivers an application manager service, replacing applications with their rewritten counterparts and ensuring their updates.
Background
This section gives a short overview of the structure of Android applications, their execution environment, and the permission system in Android.
Android Applications
Applications (Apps) are delivered in zipped packages (apk files). They contain multimedia content for the user interface, configuration files such as the manifest, and the bytecode which is stored in a Dalvik executable (dex file). Based on the underlying Linux, Android allots user and group IDs to each application.
Four basic types of components can be used to build an App: activities, services, content providers, and broadcast receivers. Activities constitute the user interface of an application. Multiple activities can be defined but only one activity can be active at a time. Services are used to perform time-consuming or background tasks. Specific API functions trigger remote procedure calls and can be used to interact with services. Application can define content providers to share their structured data with other Apps. To retrieve this data, so called ContentResolvers must be used. They use URIs to access a provider and query it for specific data. Finally, broadcast receivers enable applications to exchange intents. Intents express an intent to perform an action within or on a component. Actions include the display of a picture or the opening of a specific web page.
Developers usually use these components defined in the Android API and the SDK to build, compile, and pack Apps. Their apks are signed with the private developer key, distributed via the official Android market, other markets, or it is delivered directly to a Smartphone.
Dalvik Virtual Machine
Bytecode is stored in Dalvik executables (dex files) and is executed in a register based virtual machine (VM) called Dalvik. Each VM runs in its own application process. The system process Zygote starts at boot time and manages the spawning of new VMs. It also preloads and preinitializes the core library classes.
Dex files are optimized for size and data sharing among classes. In contrast to standard Java archives, the dex does not store several class files. All classes are compiled into one single dex file. This reduces load time and supports efficient code management. Type-specific mappings are defined over all classes and map constant properties of the code to static identifiers, such as constant values, class, field, and method names. The bytecode can also contain developer code not available on the platform, e.g. third-party code, such as plugins (see Figure 2) .
Bytecode instructions use numbered register sets for their computations. For method calls, registers passed as arguments are simply copied into new registers only valid during method execution. 
Android Permissions
Android permissions control application access to resources. Depending on their potential impact Android distinguishes three levels: normal, dangerous, signature and signatureORsystem. Unlike normal permission which do not directly cause financial harm to users, dangerous and system permission control access to critical resources and may enable access to private data. Granted signature or signaturesORsystem permission grant access to essential system services and data. During installation permissions are assigned as requested in the manifest. The user only approves dangerous permissions. Normal permissions are granted without notification and signature or signatureORsystem permissions verify that the application requesting the permissions has been signed with the key of the device manufacturer.
Resource access can be obtained through API calls, the processing of intents, and through access to content providers and other system resources such as an SD card. Thus, permission enforcement varies with the type of resource accessed. In general, permission assignment and enforcement can be described using a label model as depicted in Figure 2 . Each system resource or system service is labeled with the set of permissions it requires to be accessed. An application uses the public API to trigger resource access. This request is forwarded to the system. The system libraries, the binder, and the implementation of the libraries finally execute the resource access. We abstract from the details of the binderlibrary pair and call this entity a central permission monitor. It checks whether an application trying to access a resource with label L x has been assigned this label. If not, access is forbidden and an appropriate security exception is thrown.
Android also places permission checks in the API and RPC calls [9] . Thus, security exceptions may already occur although the access requests have not reached the permission monitor, yet. As such checks may be circumvented by reflection the actual enforcement happens in the system.
The URANOS Framework
This section explains our system in more detail. To ease the understanding we complement our description with Figure 3 . 
Application Processing
To process manifest and bytecode of the application, URANOS must obtain access to the apks. Depending on how the developer decides how to publish an APK, it is stored in different file system locations: the regular application storage, the application storage on an SD card, or storage which prevents the forwarding (forward-lock) of the application. The PackageManager API offered by Android can be used to retrieve the path and filename of the apks. Regular applications are able to obtain reading access to other apks. Thus, as a regular application, URANOS can copy apks to a local folder and process them. With root permissions, it can also process forward-locked applications.
Apks are extracted to obtain access to the manifest and the dex file. We enhanced the dex-tools from the Android source tree. It directly operates on the bytecode and can extract information required for our analysis. Thus, we avoid intermediate representations. Handles to manifest and bytecode are forwarded (1) to the static analysis and rewriting components of our framework.
Permission Detection
Next, we parse the manifest and retrieve the set P apk of permissions requested by the App. Afterwards, we scan the bytecode to find all invoke instructions and determine the correct signature of the methods invoked. Invoke instructions use identifiers pointing to entries of a management table which contains complete method signatures. From this table we derive the set I of methods potentially invoked during execution. As this is a syntactical process set I may contain methods which are never called.
We then use function π to compute P M = ∀m∈I π(m), i.e. π maps method m to a set of permissions required to invoke m at runtime. Thus, P M reflects the permissions required by the application to execute all methods in I. Function π is based on the results of Felt et al. [9] which associate actions in an Android App with its required permissions, e.g. method calls.
The use of content providers or intents may also require permissions. However, specific targets of both can be specified using ordinary strings. To keep our analysis process simple we search the dex for strings which map the pattern of a content provider URI or of a activity class name which is defined in the Android API. If a pattern is matched, we add the respective permission to the set P P of provider permissions or to the set P I of intent permissions, respectively.
At the end of this process we intersect the permissions specified in the manifest with the permissions extracted from the bytecode, i.e. P val = P apk ∩ (P M ∪ P P ∪ P I ) to obtain the validated permissions likely to be required for the execution of the application. Our heuristics induce an over-approximation in this set. Section 5 explains why it does not influence the security of our approach.
Context Detection
Based on P val we now determine the App components in which the methods requiring these permissions are called. For this purpose we define the execution context for an instruction. It is the signature of the method and its class in which the instruction is executed. This definition is generic and can be applied to various detection problems. We focuse on widely distributed plugins for Android.
To give users a better understanding on the possible impact of the plugins hosted by the analyzed Apps we manually assign each plugin to the following four categories: passive, active, audio advertising, and feature extensions.
Passive advertising plugins display advertisements as soon as an activity of the hosting application is active. They are usually integrated into the user interface with banners as placeholders. Active advertising plugins are similar to pop-up windows and do not require a hosting applications. They use stand alone activities or services, intercept intents, or customize events to become active. Audio advertising is a rather new plugin category which intercepts control sequences and interferes with the user by playing audio commercials or similar audio content, e.g. while hearing the call signal on the phone. Feature extensions include features in an application a user or developer may utilize. Among many others, they include in-app billing or developer plugins easing the debugging process.
To detect plugins in an application, we perform the same steps required for archiving the signatures. We scan the application manifest and bytecode for the names listed above and investigate which libraries have to be loaded at runtime. From this information we build a signature and try to match it against our plugin database. This process also uses fuzzy patterns to match the strings inferred from the application. We assume that plugins follow common naming conventions. So, full class names should start with the top Internet domain name, continue with the appropriate company name, and end with the class names. If we do not find matches on full class names, we search for longest common prefixes. If they contain at least two subdomains, we continue searching for the other names to refine the plugin match. In this way we can account for smaller or intentional changes in class or package naming and prevent a considerable decline of the detection rate.
The ability to detect classes of plugins allows us to determine execution contexts. During the bytecode scanning, we track the context C. As soon as our analysis enters the namespace of a plugin class, we change C. It is defined by the name of the plugin N P lugin or by the name N apk of the application if no plugin matches. We generate a map for each method call to its calling context. Together with the function π, this implicitly defines a map γ from permissions to calling contexts. We can now distinguish four types of permissions:
Dispensable permissions p ∈ P apk \ P val are not required by the application, Application only permissions p ∈ P apk are exclusively required for the hosting application to run, i.e. γ(p) = {N apk }, Plugin only permissions p ∈ P apk are exclusively required for the execution of a plugin, i.e. γ(p) ∩ {N apk } = ∅, and Hybrid permissions p ∈ P apk which are required by both, the hosting application and the plugin, i.e. γ(p) does not match the conditions for the other three permission types.
This result is communicated to the user in step (2) . He gets an overview of the types of permissions and the context in which they are required. The user can enable or disable them in the entire application, only in the plugin, or only in the hosting application. The next section shows how to support this feature with the help of bytecode rewriting and without modifying Android.
Rewriter
In general, dispensable permissions are not required for the execution and don't need to be assigned to the application. They can removed from the manifest. The same holds for permissions which should be disabled for the entire application. Thus, the first rewriting step is performed on the application manifest. It revokes the permissions either not required or not desired.
However, withdrawing permissions from an application may render it unusable. Calls to methods which require permissions will throw exceptions. If they are not handled correctly, the runtime environment could finally interrupt execution. To avoid this problem, enable the deactivation of permissions in only specific application components, and to retain an unmodified Android core, the activation or deactivation of permissions triggers a rewriting process (3). It is guided by the results of the syntactical analysis (4). The rewriter, described in this section, adapts the bytecode in such a way that the App can be executed safely even without the permissions it originally requested. API Methods For each method whose execution requires a permission, we provide two types of wrappers (5) to replace the original call. Regular API method calls which require a permission, can be wrapped by simple try and catch blocks as depicted by WRAPPER1 in Listing 1.1. If the permission required to execute the API call has been withdrawn, we catch the exception and return a feasible default value. In case the permission is still valid, the original method is called. In contrast, the second wrapper WRAPPER2 (Listing 1.2) completely replaces the original API call and only executes a default action. Evidently, rewriting could be reduced to only WRAPPER2. But, WRAPPER1 reduces the number of events at which an application has to be rewritten and reinstalled. Assume that a user deactivates a permission for the entire application. The permission is removed from the manifest and all methods requiring it are wrapped. Depending on the wrapper and the next change in the permission settings a rewriting may be avoided because the old wrapper already handles the new settings, e.g. the reactivation of the permission.
Wrappers are static methods and apart from one additional instance argument for non-static methods, they inherit the number and type of arguments from the methods they wrap. This makes it easy to automatically derive them from the API. Additionally, it simplifies the rewriting process as follows.
URANOS delivers a dex file which contains the bytecode of all wrappers. This file is merged with the original application dex using the dx compiler libraries. The new dex now contains the wrappers but does not make use of them, yet. In the next step we obtain the list of method calls which need to be replaced from the static analysis component (4) . The corresponding invoke instructions are relocated in the new dex and the old method identifiers are exchanged with the identifiers of the corresponding wrapper methods.
Here, the rewriting process is finished even if the wrapped method is nonstatic. At bytecode level, the replacement of a non-static method with a static one simply induces a new interpretation of the registers involved in the call. The register originally storing the object instance is now interpreted as the first method argument. Thus, we pass the instance register to the wrapper in the first argument and can leave all other registers in the bytecode untouched. We illustrate this case in Listing 1.3. It shows bytecode mnemonics for the invocation of the API method getDeviceId as obtained by a disassemblers. . _getDeviceId :( Landroid / telephony / T e l e p h o n y M a n a g e r ;) Ljava / lang / String ;
The instruction invoke-virtual calls the method getDeviceId on an instance of class TelephonyManager. It is rewritten to a static call in Listing 1.4 and passes the instance as an argument to the static wrapper method.
Reflection Android supports reflective method calls. They use strings to retrieve or generate instances of classes and to call methods on such instances.
These operations can be constructed at runtime. Hence, the targets of reflective calls are not decidable during analysis and calls to API methods may remain undetected. Therefore, we wrap the methods which can trigger reflective calls, i.e. invoke and newInstance. During runtime, these wrappers check the Method instance passed to invoke or the class instance on which newInstance is called. Depending on its location in the bytecode the reflection wrapper is constructed in such a way that it passes the invocation to the appropriate wrapper methods (see above) or executes the function in the original bytecode. This does not require dynamic monitoring but can be integrated in the bytecode statically. Reflection calls show low performance and are used very infrequently. Thus, this rewriting will not induce high additional overhead.
Content Providers Similar to reflective calls, we handle content providers. Providers must be accessed via content resolvers (see Section 3) which forward the operations to be performed on a content provider: query, insert, update, and delete. They throw security exceptions if required read or write permissions are not assigned to an application. As these methods specify the URI of the content provider we replace all operations by a static wrapper which passes their call to a monitor. It checks whether the operation is allowed before executing it.
Intents In general, intents are not problematic as they are handled in the central monitor of Android, i.e. the enforcement does not happen in the application. If an application sends an intent to a component which requires permissions an exception in the error log is generated if the application does not have this permission. The corresponding action is not executed but the application does not crash. Thus, our rewriting must cover situations in which only some instructions in specific execution contexts must not send or receive intents. The control over sending can be realized by wrappers handling the available API methods such as startActivity, broadcastIntent, startService, and bindService. The wrappers implement monitors which first analyse the intent to be sent. Depending on the target, the sending is aborted. By rewriting the manifest, we can control which intents a component can receive. This excludes explicit intents which directly address a application component. Here, we assume that the direct access of a system component to an application can be considered legitimate.
Application Management
We realize permission revocation by repackaging applications. First, our App manager obtains the manifest and dex (6) from the rewriter. For recovery, we first backup the old dex file and its corresponding manifest. All other resources, such as libraries, images, audio or video files, etc. are not backed up as they remain untouched. They are extracted from the original apk (7), signed with the URANOS key together with the new bytecode and manifest. The signed application is then directly integrated into a new apk. This process is slow due to the zip compression of the archive. In the end, the application manager assists the user to deinstall the old and install the new application (8, 9) .
In the background we also deploy a dedicated update service. It mimics the update functionality of Android but also operates on the applications resigned by URANOS. We regularly query the application market for updates, inform the user about them, and assists the update process by deinstalling the old App, rewriting the new App, and installing it. Similarly, the App manager provides support for deinstallation and recovery.
Discussion

Performance
To assess the performance of our approach we downloaded over 180 popular applications from the Google Play Store. The URANOS App was adjusted in such a way that it automatically starts analysing and rewriting newly installed applications. Our benchmark measured the analysis time, i.e. the preprocessing of the dex (pre) and the execution context detection (det), and the rewriting time, i.e. the merging of wrappers (wrap), the rewriting of the resulting dex (rew), and the total time require to generate the final apk (tot). The analysis and rewriting phase were repeated 11 times for each App. The first measurement was ignored as memory management and garbage collection often greatly influence the first measurements and hard to reproduce as they heavily depend on the phone state. For the rewriting process, we always selected three random permissions to be disabled. If there were less permissions we disabled all. All measurements were conducted on a Motorola RAZR XT910, running Android 4.0.4 on a 3.0.8 kernel. Due to space restrictions this contribution only discusses a selection of applications and their performance figures. An overview of the complete results, a report on the impact of our rewriting on the App functionality, and the App itself are available at http://web.sec.uni-passau.de/research/uranos/.
Apart from the time measurements mentioned above Table 1 enumerates the number of plugins the application contains (#pl), the number of permissions requested (#pm), the number classes (#cl) in the dex and the size of the apk. In particular the apk size has a tremendous impact on the generation of the rewritten application due to APK compression. This provides potential for optimization in particular if we look at the rather small time required to merge the wrapper file of 81 kB into the complex dex structure and redirecting the method calls. This complexity is also reflected in the time for pre-processing the dex to extract information required to work on the bytecode.
We can also see that the number of classes and permissions included in an application influence the analysis time. Classes increase the number of administrative overhead in a dex. Thus their number also increases the effort to search for the appropriate code locations. Here, Shazam and Instagram are two extreme examples. In turn, the number of permissions increase the number of methods which have to considered during analysis and rewriting.
